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Abstract—Angle of Arrival (AoA) estimation has found its way
to a wide range of applications. Much attention have been paid to
study different techniques for AoA estimation and its applications
for jamming suppression, however, security vulnerability issues
of AoA estimation itself under hostile activity have not been
paid the same attention. In this paper, the problem of AoA
estimation in Rician flat fading channel under jamming condition
is investigated. We consider the scenario in which a receiver with
multiple antenna is trying to estimate the AoA of the specular
line of sight (LOS) component of signal received from a given
single antenna transmitter using a predefined training sequence.
A jammer equipped with multiple antennas is trying to interrupt
the AoA estimation phase by sending an arbitrary signal. We
derive the optimal jammer and receiver strategies in various
scenarios based on the knowledge of the opponent strategies and
the available information about the communication channel. In all
scenarios, we derive the optimal jammer signal design as well as
its optimal power allocation policy. The results show the optimality
of the training based Maximum Likelihood (ML) AoA estimator
in case of randomly generated jamming signal. We also show that,
the optimal jammer strategy is to emit a signal identical to the
predefined training sequence turning the estimation process into a
highest power competition scenario in which the detected AoA is
the one for the transmitting entity of higher power. The obtained
results are supported by the provided computer simulation.
Index Terms—AoA Estimation; Optimal Jamming; CRB; ML
Estimator.
I. INTRODUCTION
AoA estimation is one of the most important applications of
array signal processing. It has found its way to a wide range
of applications in military, navigation, radar, law enforcement
and some commercial communication systems. Anti-jamming
is one of the most interesting applications of AoA estimation.
Recently in [1], an anti-jamming mechanism for receivers oper-
ating in a cognitive radio network using AoA estimation com-
bined with adaptive beamforming is presented. The use of AoA
estimation in wireless physical layer authentication is another
promising application. In [2], Xiong and Jamieson proposed
a novel signal processing technique leverage multi-antenna
receiver to profile the directions at which a certain transmission
arrives, using this AoA information to construct highly sensitive
signatures that with very high probability uniquely identify
each client. Despite the fact that much attention paid to the
enhancement of AoA estimation and the promising results
reported about its various applications, performance measure
on AoA estimation under jamming attacks did not receive
the same attention. To that end, we develop a framework in
which we evaluate the optimal attack strategies to degrade the
AoA estimation performance. Subsequently, we find the optimal
estimator under jamming attack and evaluate its performance.
We clearly identify the conditions under which the attacker
successfully manages to derail the estimator and the cases in
which the attack can be overcome by the legitimate receiver.
In the general problem of AoA estimation, various signal
models have been investigated in literature based on the number
of estimated signal sources, modeling of noise process, coop-
eration between emitting and receiving nodes and implications
of multipath environment. In a non cooperative environment,
where the emitted signal is unknown, the subspace techniques
such as multiple signal classifier MUSIC [3] and estimation
of signal parameters via rotational invariant technique ESPRIT
[4] were developed with no knowledge required about the
emitted signal. Performance analysis of conditional and uncon-
ditional ML-AoA estimator have been presented in [5]. There,
conditional ML estimator model the unknown emitted signal
as a random process where it is modeled as a deterministic
unknown parameter in the unconditional ML estimator. A
crucial requirement for all the aforementioned AoA estimation
techniques in a non cooperative regime that the number of
signals that can be estimated has to be less than the receiver
array size. However, in a hostile jamming environment or in
a varying interference conditions this condition will fail if the
rank of the received signal plus jamming/interference exceeds
the array size. Meanwhile, in a cooperative environment, where
transmitters and receivers share a predefined signal waveform,
it was shown in [6] that exploitation of the known signal
waveform enables a successfull estimation of number of sources
greater than the array size using ML estimator. Despite of this
considerable advantage, a huge computational complexity of the
ML estimator is considered a major disadvantage as it requires
a K-dimensional search algorithm for estimating AoAs of K
incident signals. In [6] this problem have been resolved by the
so called decoupled ML (DEML) estimator which turns the
K-dimensional search problem into K one-dimensional search
problem. Another advantage for the work therein that the results
were obtained for an arbitrary interference covariance matrix.
In this work, we explore the effect of Rician fading en-
vironment on AoA estimation in the presence of a hostile
jamming activity. In Rician fading environment, the received
signal can be decomposed into two components; one is the
specular component results from the LOS path and the other is
the diffuse component due to multipath reflections, or generally
the non-line of sight component (NLOS). The LOS component
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Fig. 1. System Model
can be considered fixed while the NLOS component can be best
described as a Rayleigh fading channel. For AoA estimation
purposes, only the specular LOS component is considered as a
signal of interest (SOI) while the diffuse NLOS component is
considered as an undesired interference. This fact turns the AoA
estimation process into a challenging task due to the inherit
correlation between specular and diffuse component carrying
the same signal waveform.
Despite the results for AoA estimation for an arbitrary
interference covariance matrix, under jamming conditions these
results doesn’t hold directly. That is because, in contrast to
arbitrary interference, the jamming process is an intended
hostile activity that may have the ability to adopt, maneuver
or change strategies to achieve the intended goal. Hence, based
on the capabilities, availability of information about the target
receiver design and CSI, we analyze both optimal jammer
and, on the other side, receiver strategies in a game theoretic
approach.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the rest of this paper we use boldface uppercase letters for
random vectors/matrices, uppercase letters for their realizations,
bold face lowercase letters for deterministic vectors and lower-
case letters for its elements. While, (.)∗ denotes conjugate of
complex number, (.)† denotes conjugate transpose, IN denotes
identity matrix of size N , tr(.) denotes matrix trace operator,
var(.) denotes variance of random variable, det(.) denotes
matrix determinant operator and 1m×n denotes a m×n matrix
of all 1’s.
A. System model
As depicted in Fig.1, we consider the scenario where a
mobile receiver is trying to estimate the AoA of the the signal
emitted from a certain fixed transmitter equipped with a single
antenna in the presence of a multiple antenna jammer. The
transmitter sends a predefined training sequence, xt ∈ CL, from
which the AoA will be estimated. The receiver is equipped
with a uniform linear array (ULA) antenna that consists of
nr elements placed along a linear array with neighboring
antennas spaced at a distance dr. On the other side, the jammer
is equipped with a ULA antenna of size nj . We assume a
narrowband system under flat fading with a single significant
channel tap. The discrete baseband equivalent channel for the
signal received by the legitimate receiver at the lth time slot
can be expressed as:
Y[l] = Ht[l]xt[l] + Hj [l]Xj [l] + N[l], (1)
where xt[l] ∈ C is the lth symbol of the predefined training
sequence. The training sequence xt = [xt1, .., xtL]T is con-
strained by both an instantaneous maximum power constraint
|xt[l]|2 ≤ Pmaxt and a sum power constraint tr
(
xtx
†
t
)
≤ P tott .
The jammer signal Xj [l] is nj dimensional and it satisfies
a total power constraint tr(Qj [l]) ≤ Pj ., where Qj [l] =
Xj [l]X
†
j [l]. Also, Ht[l] ∈ Cnr×1 is the channel coefficients
vector between transmitter and receiver, Hj [l] ∈ Cnr×nj is the
channel coefficients matrix between jammer and receiver at the
lth time index and N[l] ∈ Cnr×1 is an independent zero mean
circular symmetric complex random vector, N ∼ CN (0, Rn)
where Rn = σ2nInr . Thus, we can define the Signal to Jamming
and Noise Ratio (SJNR) as follows:
SJNR =
‖Ht[l]xt[l]‖2
‖Hj [l]Xj [l]‖2 + σ2n
.
While the results we will drive are valid for all stationary
and ergodic channel models, we will illustrate our examples
on the Rician fading channel. Therefore, we next give some
basics of the Rician fading channels. In Rician fading model,
the received signal can be decomposed into two components;
one is the specular component results from the LOS path and
the other is the diffuse component due to multipath reflections.
or generally the non-line of sight component (NLOS). The LOS
component can be considered fixed while the NLOS component
can be best described as a Rayleigh fading channel. Since
both transmitter and jammer channels are Rician, we give the
channel description for both transmitter and jammer channels
with the subscripts t, j are dropped. We consider a general
transmitter and receiver with Nt and Nr array sizes.
H = HLOS + HNLOS, (2)
where HLOS and HNLOS represents the LOS and NLOS com-
ponents respectively and
HLOS =
√
k
1 + k
(
1√
2
+
j√
2
)
Ψˆ
Ψˆ = ar(θ)a
†
t(φ)
HNLOS =
√
1
2(1 + k)
Hˆ, (3)
where k is the Ricean factor, ar(θ) and at(φ) are the antenna
array steering vectors at receiver and transmitter respectively,
θ and φ are the AoA and the angle of departure (AoD) of
the transmitted signal respectively, as shown in Fig.1. In case
of single antenna transmitter, we consider at(φ) = 1. There
are no prior distribution assumed for θ and φ. Therefore, the
associated estimation problem is non-Bayesian. For the ULA
configuration, the entries of the steering vectors are given by
a(θ) =
[
1 z z2 . . . zN−1
]T
z = e
−j2pi
d sin(θ)
λ , (4)
where λ,d, and N are the wavelength of the center frequency of
the transmitted signal, array elements spacing and size respec-
tively. While Hˆ ∼ CN (0, INr×Nt) represents the channel coef-
ficients matrix for the NLOS signal component. We parametrize
the contribution of the NLOS and LOS components to the
signal with σ =
√
1/2(1 + k), µ =
√
k/1 + k, respectively
and choose µ2 + 2σ2 = 1 for simplicity. It worth mentioning
that, AWGN and Rayleigh fading channels are in fact a limiting
cases of the Rician fading channel.
B. Attack Model
In this paper we consider two different jamming scenar-
ios, signal-unaware and signal-aware jamming attacks. By
signal-unaware jamming we refer to the scenario in which the
jammer has no knowledge of the estimator, θˆ(·), the training
sequence xt and the realization of the channels, Ht[l] and Hj [l].
Signal-unaware jammer only knows the channels distributions.
Meanwhile, the signal-aware jammer knows the estimator, the
training sequence, and has perfect knowledge of the realization
of both channels.
C. Problem Statement
With the above setup we consider the problem in which the
receiver with the knowledge of the predefined training pattern,
xt, has the objective to choose an estimator θˆ(Y) that has
the minimum possible estimator variance under all possible
jamming strategies for the choice of Xj [l], l ∈ {1, . . . , L},
subject to its power constraint. On the other side, by an
appropriate design of its transmitted signal, the jammer seeks
to maximize the receiver estimator variance over all possible
receiver strategies subject to its power constraint. Hence, we
can formulate our problem as follows:
min
θˆ(·),xt
|xt[l]|2≤Pmaxt
tr(XtX
†
t )≤P tott
max
Xj [l]
tr(Qj [l])≤Pj
∀l∈1,..,L
var
(
θˆ (Y)
)
. (5)
III. BASIC LIMITS UNDER NO ATTACK
In this section, we evaluate the basic limits of AoA estima-
tion performance in the absence of the attacker. In particular,
we find a lower bound to the solution of the following problem:
min
θˆ(·),xt
|xt[l]|2≤Pmaxt
tr(XtX
†
t )≤P tott
var
(
θˆ (Y)
)
. (6)
The solution of (6) is the CRB for AoA estimation by definition.
To evaluate the CRB, we start by introducing
Z[l] = HNLOSt [l]xt[l] + N[l], (7)
where Z incorporates all undesired interfering components of
the received signal. Since the receiver objective is to estimate
the AoA of the LOS component, the NLOS diffuse component
is also considered as an undesired signal. Note that Z[l] ∼
CN (0nr×1,Rz[l]). Accordingly, the posterior distribution of
the observation Y is given as follows:
f(Y/HLOSt ,xt,Z)
(Y) =
1∏L
i=1 det(piRz[l])
× exp{− 1
L
L∑
i=1
(Y[l]−HLOSt [l]xt[l])†Rz[l]−1
(Y[l]−HLOSt [l]xt[l])
}
, (8)
which yields the following log-likelihood function
L(Y) = −
L∑
i=1
ln det(piRz[l])
− tr (R−1z (Y −HLOSt xt)(Y −HLOSt xt)†) , (9)
where Rz =
1
L
∑L
i=1 Rz[l]. Further, It can be shown that, the
CRB of AoA estimation is given by
CRB =
1
2
[
L∑
l=1
Re
(
µtx
†
t [l]Dˆ
†G(θ)Dˆxt[l]µt
)]−1
=
1 + kt
2LktP
max
t Dˆ
†G(θ)Dˆ
, (10)
where
Dˆ = R−1/2z D
D = ∂a/∂θ
G(θ) = [I− a(a†a)−1a†]
where the dependence of a on θ was dropped for ease of
notation. We note that, as kt → ∞, only LOS component is
present and Rz → σ2nInr . Note that, this result is in agreement
with that derived in [6]. Also, one can show that (this was also
discussed in [6]) efficient estimator exists only asymptotically
in the array size for any choice of xt that satisfies the power
constraint. Moreover, the ML estimator given by:
θˆ(Y) = max
θ
∣∣a†R−1z B∣∣2
a†R−1z a
= min
θ
B†R−1/2z G(θ)R
−1/2
z B (11)
achieves the CRB with equality asymptotically in the large
array size limit, where
B = R†xyR
−1
xx ∈ Cnr×1 (12)
Rxy =
1
L
L∑
l=1
xt[l]Y
†[l] ∈ C1×nr
Rxx =
1
L
L∑
l=1
xt[l]xt[l]
∗ ∈ C.
The results obtained in this section will be useful in the
subsequent analysis in the rest of this paper.
IV. OPTIMAL JAMMER STRATEGIES
In this section we evaluate the optimal jammer strategies
in the two different attack scenarios described in Section II.
We start with the signal-unaware jamming scenario then we
consider the worst case of jamming in which the jammer is
aware with the receiver strategies.
A. Optimal Strategy for The Signal-Unaware Jammer
In this subsection we consider the scenario where the only
information available to the jammer is the statistical distribution
of both channels. Here, the jammer has no knowledge on the es-
timator, θˆ(Y), or the training sequence, xt. Hence, the attacker
will target the optimal estimator performance, assuming that the
receiver is using the (asymptotically) efficient estimator. Note
that this attacker strategy also optimal for the attacker if the
receiver is using the ML estimator. Thus, it will consider first
the minimization problem in (6) whose solution is the CRB
is given in Eq. (10) for any arbitrary interference covariance
matrix Rz which can be evaluated as
Rz =
(
Pmaxt
1 + kt
+ σ2n
)
Inr + E
[
HjQjH
†
j
]
(13)
(we derive this results in Appendix C). Hence, the jammer
objective is to find Xj and Qj that both maximize the CRB ex-
pression and satisfy the power constraint. It can be formulated
as follows:
Xj ,Qj = arg min
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
D†R−1/2z G(θ)R
−1/2
z D, (14)
where the dependence on time slot index l was dropped for
ease of notation. We give the optimal jamming strategy as the
solution of Eq. (14) in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Given that statistical channel distribution is
available at the jammer, the optimal jamming signal, Xj [l],
that provides the solution of Eq. (14) is a Gaussian vector
with independent entries generated according to Xj [l] ∼
CN (0,Qj) ∀ l ∈ {1, 2, .., L}, where Qj is a diagonal matrix
with
Qi,ij =

min
{
Pj
nj
,
kj(1 + kj)
nr(1 + njkj)
}
nj +
[
Pj
nj
− kj(1 + kj)
nr(1 + njkj)
]+
i = 1[
Pj
nj
− kj(1 + kj)
nr(1 + njkj)
]+
1 < i ≤ nj
,
(15)
and 0 ≤ kj <∞ with [x]+ = max{0, x}.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
We note that, this result is in agreement with the optimal
power allocation policy derived in [7] for a transmitter aiming
to maximize it’s mutual information over a Rician MIMO
channel. It also worth noting that, as the Rician factor, kj → 0,
we notice that Qj → (Pj/nj)Inj , which is the uniform power
allocation policy. Thus, for the relatively small values of the
Rician factor, kj , the uniform power allocation policy is near
optimal even if the channel distribution is unavailable at the
jammer. The influence of using the uniform power allocation
policy rather than the optimal one will be discussed in more
details in Section VI.
B. Optimal Strategy for The Signal-Aware Jammer
In the previous section, we showed that with no knowledge
about both receiver strategies and CSI, the optimal jammer
strategy is to generate a Gaussian signal with power allocation
policy as defined in (15). In this section, we consider the
case where both the training sequence, xt, and the estimator,
θˆ(Y), are known to the jammer. Also, perfect CSI about
both channels in the form of channel realizations, Ht[l] and
Hj [l] ∀l ∈ {1, 2, .., L}, are assumed to be known to a signal-
aware jammer. In this case, the jammer objective is to find Xj
and Qj that both maximize the error of the estimator θˆ(Y)
and satisfy the power constraint. Since the ML estimator is
an asymptotically efficient estimator, then, to maximize the
ML estimator variance, a signal-aware jammer can consider
maximizing the CRB based on its available information. Thus,
the optimal jammer strategies are again the solution of Eq. (14)
taking into consideration the knowledge of the receiver strate-
gies. We give the optimal jammer strategies in the following
theorem:
Theorem 2. Given that both the training sequence, xt[l], and
perfect CSI available at the jammer, the optimal jamming signal
that provides the solution of Eq. (14) can be found as:
Qi,ij =
{ (
µ− λ−1il
)+
if 1 < i ≤ n
0 if n < i ≤ nj
, (16)
where λ1l, λ2l, ..., λnl are the eigenvalues of Hj [l]H
†
j [l] with
n = min{nr, nj}, µ is a constant chosen to satisfy the power
constraint and
X
(i)
j [l] =
{ √(
µ− λ−1il
)+ xt[l]
|xt[l]|2
if 1 < i ≤ n
0 if n < i ≤ nj
. (17)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Comparing the optimal jamming strategies in signal-unaware
to that in the signal-aware jamming scenario we observe that,
the knowledge of the training sequence xt is a considerable
advantage to the jammer. It grants the jammer the ability
to design its signal aligned to the training sequence. Under
this scenario for equal jammer and transmitter power, the
ML spectrum output from the ML-AoA estimator shall be
maximized in both the transmitter and jammer directions as
can be seen in Fig. (4). Meanwhile, as the jammer power
exceeds that of the transmitter, the ML spectrum is maximized
in the jammer direction rather than the receiver one. Thus we
conclude that, a signal aware jammer turns the AoA estimation
process into a higher power competition in which the ML
estimator outputs an estimate to the AoA of the transmitting
entity of higher power. A more details about this scene are
given in Section VI. We have studied the optimal jamming
strategies in both attack scenarios, we now turn our attention
to the optimal receiver strategies in two scenarios, known and
unknown jammer strategies.
V. OPTIMAL AOA ESTIMATOR
In this section, first evaluate the optimal estimator under the
toy case in which the jammer strategies and CSI are known
to the receiver. With the insights drawn, we solve the case in
which the attacker strategy, as well as CSI is unknown to the
receiver.
A. Optimal AoA Estimator With Known Jammer Strategies
Assuming the jammer strategies, Xj [l] ∀l, and perfect CSI
availability at the receiver, the noise, diffuse component and
jamming covariance matrix is fully characterized at the receiver.
That is because both channels realization and transmitted sig-
nals are known to the receiver. Thus, the receiver can substitute
Rz directly into (11) to form the ML estimator. Simulation
results provided in Section VI show the superior performance
of ML estimator with known jammer strategies. It shows that
the knowledge of jammer strategies provides a considerable
performance enhancement even for the case of signal-aware
jammer. More discussion about these results will be provided
in Section VI. The effect of unknown jamming strategies will
be discussed in the next section.
B. Optimal AoA Estimator With Unknown Jammer Strategies
In this section, the receiver is assumed to know only the
statistical distribution of the channels. In Section IV-B, we
showed that the worst case jamming strategy is to mate its
transmitted signal to the target training sequence. In such
scenario the interference covariance matrix can be evaluated
as follows
Rz =
(
Pmaxt
1 + kt
+ σ2n
)
Inr + PjΥˆ, (18)
where Υˆ ∈ Cnr×nr is as defined in (23) (the derivation of
this result is given in Appendix C). Direct substitution from
(18) into (10) and (11) yields the CRB and the associated ML
estimator solution for the optimization problem given in (5) for
any choice of xt that satisfies the power constraints.
Simulation results provided shows that the ML estimator is
inefficient against a signal-aware jammer despite the advantage
of having the channel statistical distribution. As can be seen
in Figures (7), (8) and (9), the normalized ML spectrum is
maximized towards the direction of the transmitting entity of
higher power direction even if statistical channel distribution is
available at the receiver.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
The simulation results provided in this section is based on
the following simulation setup:
• Array Size. Both receiver and jammer are of array
size nr = nj = 4 while the transmitter has a single
antenna.
• Transmitter Signal. The predefined training sequence
xt, is generated from a zero mean, unit variance
complex Gaussian random variable, fixed once chosen
and shared to the receiver.
• Jammer Signal. In the Signal-Unaware scenario, the
Jammer signal Xj [l], is generated from a zero mean,
unit variance complex Gaussian random variable and
scaled to satisfy the power constraint. Meanwhile, in
the Signal-Aware scenario it is chosen identical to the
training sequence.
• Communication Channels. The communication
channels, Ht and Hj , are generated according to
Equations (2) and (3). The entries of the channel ma-
trix of the Rayleigh part of the channel are generated
from a zero mean, unit variance complex Gaussian
random variable and then scaled each by the corre-
sponding value of σ.
A. Evaluation of The CRB
In Fig.(2), the CRB is plotted as a function of the AoA,
θ, in logarithmic scale for a training sequence of length 64
at a signal to noise ratio (SNR) = 15dB. While the jammer
is emitting a random signal with power budget equal to that
of the transmitter, which implies (SJNR) < 0dB. The figure
provides comparison between the CRB for the jamming free
environment to that for a jammer with uniform power allocation
policy and also for a jammer uses the optimal power allocation
policy derived in Eq. (15). Note that, the uniform power
allocation policy is optimal for kj = 0, hence, for relatively
small kj values the uniform power allocation policy provides
a perform close to optimal. To highlight the difference in their
performance, we use kj = 10dB. As can be seen in Fig. (2),
the use of the optimal power allocation policy derived in Eq.
(15) has a superior performance compared to the uniform power
allocation scheme in case of large values of the Rician factor kj .
Similar comparison is given in Fig. (3) except that the jammer
is emitting a signal identical to the training sequence with four
times the power available at the transmitter. Note that, the use
of the training sequence as a jamming signal did not affect the
CRB. That is because the plotted CRB is for any unbiased
estimator, however, using a jamming signal identical to the
training sequence adds bias to the ML estimator.
B. ML Estimator Performance under Jamming
To evaluate the performance of the ML estimator under
jamming conditions, we provide simulation results for different
scenarios of jamming strategies as well as the amount of
information available at the receiver. First we start by the case
where no channel knowledge is available at the receiver. In Fig.
Fig. 2. CRB as a function of the AoA in log scale, SNR = 15dB, Pj = Pt,
kj = 10dB
Fig. 3. CRB as a function of the AoA in log scale, SNR = 15dB, Pj = 4Pt,
kj = 10dB
(4, the transmitter is located is at 12◦, the jammer is located
at 50◦ and the jamming power equal to that of the transmitter.
We notice that, For the signal-unaware jamming scenario where
the optimal jamming signal is Gaussian generated as stated in
Theorem 1, the ML output is maximized in the direction of the
SOI as of the case of the jamming free model. As the jammer
aligns its signal to the predefined training pattern, the ML
estimator starts to bias towards the signal with higher power.
This will be clear in Fig. (5), where the transmitter is located
is at 43◦, the jammer is located at −63◦ and the jamming
power is twice that of the transmitter. While in Fig. (6) the
transmitter is located is at 23◦ and the jammer is located at
40◦ and the jamming power is four times the transmitter power.
We see that in case of random jamming, the effect of jamming
power appear as an increased estimator error. Meanwhile, as the
jammer aligns its signal to the training sequence, the estimator
is biased towards the jammer signal rather than transmitter
one. The ML estimator exhibits the same behavior when only
statistical channel distribution information is available at the
receiver as seen in Figures (7), (8) and (9).
In case of perfect CSI availability about both channels at
the receiver, we see in Figures (10), (11) and (12) that the
ML estimator have a considerable performance even for an
increased jamming power.
Fig. 4. ML Normalized Spectrum without CSI, θt = 12◦, θj = 50◦ and
Pj = Pt
Fig. 5. ML Normalized Spectrum without CSI, θt = 43◦, θj = −63◦ and
Pj = 2Pt
VII. CONCLUSION
The vulnerability of AoA estimation to hostile jamming
activity is studied. we considered the problem of AoA esti-
mation in Rician flat fading channel under jamming condition.
We showed that in case of unknown receiver strategy, the
optimal jamming signal is Gaussian. Moreover, if the jammer
have the knowledge of the receiver strategy, its optimal sig-
nal design is to align its signal to the training pattern used
for AoA estimation. Also, optimal power allocation policy
based on the amount of information available at the jammer
Fig. 6. ML Normalized Spectrum without CSI, θt = 23◦, θj = 40◦ and
Pj = 4Pt
Fig. 7. ML Normalized Spectrum with Statistical Channel distribution, θt =
12◦, θj = 50◦ and Pj = Pt
Fig. 8. ML Normalized Spectrum with Statistical Channel distribution, θt =
43◦, θj = −63◦ and Pj = 2Pt
Fig. 9. ML Normalized Spectrum with Statistical Channel distribution, θt =
23◦, θj = 40◦ and Pj = 4Pt
Fig. 10. ML Normalized Spectrum without CSI, θt = 12◦, θj = 50◦ and
Pj = Pt
Fig. 11. ML Normalized Spectrum with perfect CSI, θt = 43◦, θj = −63◦
and Pj = 2Pt
Fig. 12. ML Normalized Spectrum with perfect CSI, θt = 23◦, θj = 40◦
and Pj = 4Pt
about the communication channel is provided. It is shown
that, with CSI availability, the water filling power allocation
policy is optimal while the uniform power allocation is optimal
where no CSI available. From the receiver point of view, it
was shown that the training based ML-AoA estimator has a
superior performance in subject to the availability of perfect
CSI. Computer simulation results are provided to support and
demonstrate the obtained results. It showed the robustness
of training based ML-AoA estimator under random jamming
conditions. It also demonstrated the highest power competition
in which the detected AoA is for the transmitting entity of
higher power for a jammer with identical signal. In conclusion,
the ML estimator works efficiently in all jamming scenarios
in case of known jammer strategies. Meanwhile, in case of
unknown jamming strategies, signal-aware jammer affects the
ML performance to a large extent.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We start from the Signal-unaware jammer objective given in
Eq. (14) which is equivalent to
Xj ,Qj
(a)
= arg min
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
DR−1/2z G(θ)R
−1/2
z D
†
)
(b)
= arg min
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
R−1/2z D
†DR−1/2z G(θ)
)
(c)
= arg min
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
ΣR−1z G(θ)
)
, (19)
where (b) follows from the cyclic invariant property of the
matrix trace operator and (c) follows from
Σ = D†D =
(
2pidr cos(θ)
λ
)2 nr−1∑
i=0
i2, (20)
which holds for the ULA configuration. Substituting (13) and
ignoring the constant terms as well as the terms that are
independent to Xj and Qj we get
Xj ,Qj = arg max
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
E
[
HjQjH
†
j
])
(a)
= arg max
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
E
[
H†jHjQj
])
, (21)
where (a) follows from the cyclic invariant property of the
matrix trace operator together with the fact that trace and
expectation operators commute. First, we need to evaluate
the distribution of Xj that maximizes the above expression.
We know that the entries of the channel matrix are Gaussian
distributed as described in Section II. Hence, expanding the
trace operator in the above expression and differentiating with
respect to the distribution of Xj yields the entries of Xj should
also be Gaussian distributed. Now, we need to show that the
power allocation policy given in Theorem 1 is optimal.
Based on the availability of channel statistical information,
we evaluate
E
[
H†jHj
]
= nrΥ, (22)
where Υ is nj × nj matrix and is given by:
Υ =
1
1 + kj

1 + kj kj . . . kj
kj 1 + kj . . . kj
...
...
. . .
...
kj kj . . . 1 + kj
 . (23)
For any value of 0 ≤ k < ∞, Υ is non-singular, thus all it’s
eigenvalue are non-zero. The nj eigenvalues of Υ are given by
[8] :
λi =

1 + njkj
1 + kj
if i = 1
1
1 + kj
if 1 < i ≤ nj
0 ≤ k <∞ (24)
We apply the eigenvalue decomposition to get Υ = UΛU†
where Λ ∈ Cnj×nj is a diagonal matrix having the eigenvalues
in (24) as its diagonal entries, and U ∈ Cnj×nj is a unitary ma-
trix composed of the eigenvectors of Υ. Define Q˜j = U†QjU,
we get the following alternative expression for (21)
Xj ,Qj = arg max
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
E
[
nrQ˜jΛ
])
. (25)
The above expression is maximized for the choice of Q˜j to be
diagonal. The solution of the diagonal entries Q˜j is found by
the water filling algorithm as follows:
Q˜i,ij =

min
{
Pj
nj
,
kj(1 + kj)
nr(1 + njkj)
}
nj +
[
Pj
nj
− kj(1 + kj)
nr(1 + njkj)
]+
if i = 1[
Pj
nj
− kj(1 + kj)
nr(1 + njkj)
]+
if 1 < i ≤ nj
(26)
where 0 ≤ kj <∞ and [x]+ = max{0, x}.
We note that, the CRB evaluated for Qj is the same as
it evaluated for Q˜j . That is because HjU† has the same
distribution as Hj . Thus, the rsult of Theorem 1 follows
immediately.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We take into consideration that, channel realizations of both
transmitter and jammer channel are known to a signal-aware
jammer, thus, we follow the proof of Theorem 1 except that
we drop the expectation operator. We start by evaluating Rz in
such case
Rz =
1
L
L∑
l=1
(
HNLOSt [l]xt[l] +Hj [l]Xj [l] + N[l]
)
.
(
HNLOSt [l]xt[l] +Hj [l]Xj [l] + N[l]
)†
=
1
L
L∑
l=1
HNLOSt [l]xt[l]x
†
t [l](H
NLOS
t )
†[l]
+HNLOSt [l]xt[l]X
†
j [l]H
†
j [l]
+Hj [l]Xj [l]x
†
t [l](H
NLOS
t )
†[l]
+Hj [l]Xj [l]X
†
j [l]H
†
j [l] + σ
2
nInr (27)
Starting from Eq. (19) we substitute (27), ignore the constant
terms as well as the terms that are independent to Xj and Qj
and drop the dependence on time slot index for ease of notation,
we get
Xj , Qj = arg max
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
HNLOSt xtX
†
jH
†
j +HjQjH
†
j
)
(a)
= arg max
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
HNLOSt xtX
†
jH
†
j
)
+ tr
(
H†jHjQj
)
,
(28)
where (a) follows from the cyclic invariant property together
with the linearity of the matrix trace operator. Without the
power constraint, it is straightforward (Using Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality) to see that the first trace expression in (28) is
maximized for Xj [l] whose entries are all equal to xt[l], i.e.,
the jammer aligns its signal to that of the transmitter signal.
It remains to show that the power allocation policy stated in
Theorem 2 is optimal.
Considering the maximization of the second trace expression,
we apply the eigenvalue decomposition to get H†jHj = UΛU
†
where Λ ∈ Cnj×nj is a diagonal matrix having the eigenvalues
λ1, λ2, ..., λn as its first n diagonal entries and the other
(nj − n) entries are zeros where n = min{nr, nj}, and
U ∈ Cnj×nj is a unitary matrix composed of the eigenvectors
of H†jHj . Define Q˜j = U
†QU , we get the following alternative
expression for (28)
Xj , Qj = arg max
Xj ,Qj
tr(Qj)≤Pj
tr
(
Q˜Λ
)
. (29)
The above expression is maximized for the choice of Q˜j to be
diagonal. The solution of the diagonal entries Q˜j is found by
the water filling algorithm and the theorem follows.
APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF Rz
The interference, jamming and noise covariance matrix Rz
can be evaluated as follows
Rz
(a)
=
1
L
L∑
l=1
E
[(
HNLOSt [l]xt[l] + Hj [l]Xj [l] + N[l]
)
.
(
HNLOSt [l]xt[l] + Hj [l]Xj [l] + N[l]
)†]
(b)
=
1
L
L∑
l=1
E
[
HNLOSt [l]xt[l]x
∗
t [l](H
NLOS
t )
†[l]
]
+ E
[
Hj [l]Xj [l]X
†
j [l]H
†
j [l]
]
+ E
[
N[l]N†[l]
]
(c)
=
(
Pmaxt
1 + kt
)
Inr +
1
L
L∑
l=1
E
[
Hj [l]Qj [l]H
†
j [l]
]
+ σ2nInr ,
where (a) is a direct substitution form the definition of the
covariance matrix, in (b) we used the fact that signals, channels
and noise of both transmitter and jammer are independent.
Also, we assumed the channels distribution to be time invariant.
While in (c), we used the distribution of the NLOS component
of the received signal provided in Section II. Now using Eq.
(22), the result given in Eq. (18) is immediate.
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